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BUILDING ON SUCCESSES IN AFRICAN AGRICULTURE
Maize Breeding in East and Southern Africa, 1900–2000
MELINDA SMALE ANDT. S. JAYNE
D
uring the first half of the 20th century,African farmers
transformed maize from a minor imported foodcrop into
the continent’s principal staple food. In the second half of the
century, newly independent governments launched support
programs that greatly expanded smallholder production,
leading to substantial production surges of 10 to 20 years in
duration.Today, after widespread adoption by both commercial
farmers and smallholders, farmers now plant 58 percent of all
maize area in East and Southern Africa to new high-yielding
varieties, which on average outyield traditional varieties by
40–50 percent even without fertilizer.
The sustained domestic breeding programs that underpin
this transformation represent impressive technical and political
commitments. In 1960 Zimbabwe (then Southern Rhodesia)
released its famous SR-52, the first commercially grown single-
cross maize hybrid in the world.
Though these maize-breeding efforts were an undeniable
technical success, broader efforts to support national produc-
tion growth proved fiscally unsustainable, and once heavy
subsidies were withdrawn, production fell (see table).This
qualified success story reveals important lessons about both
the strengths and pitfalls of past agricultural development
efforts in Africa.
DRIVERS OF CHANGE
• Commercial farmer lobby. During the 1920s and 1930s
settler commercial farmers in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Zambia
successfully lobbied colonial legislatures for government assis-
tance and protection from both world markets and small-
holder competitors. Catalyzed by slumping world agricultural
markets during the worldwide depression of the 1930s, the
colonial governments created parastatal crop-buying stations in
European farming areas, offering prices that were typically far
above export parity prices.These crop-buying stations and
associated price supports were not scaled up to serve small-
holder farmers until the post-independence years. In addition,
at the urging of the commercial maize farmers, governments
established publicly funded maize research programs in 1932 in
Zimbabwe and in 1955 in Kenya.
• Breeding breakthroughs by national research
programs. Investments by colonial governments in maize
research radically transformed opportunities for maize farmers
in Kenya and Zimbabwe.Zimbabwe’s maize breeding program,
initiated in 1932,was the first outside of the United States to
produce double-cross hybrids for commercial use,releasing
Southern Rhodesia-1 (SR-l) in 1949.During the 1960s both the
Kenyan and Zimbabwean breeding programs launched a stream
of highly productive conventional and nonconventional hybrids
that fueled steady yield and output gains.From the mid-1970s
the Zambian program released an array of hybrids and improved
open-pollinated varieties.Some of these,along with the leading
hybrids released in Malawi in the early 1990s,were relatively
well suited to production by smallholders who process and
consume their grain on farm and replant saved seeds.
• Collateral support for smallholders.At independence,
governments in the region expanded the input and marketing
support institutions to serve smallholders as well.The expansion
of state marketing infrastructure in smallholder areas allowed
state agencies to disburse subsidized inputs on credit to small-
holders and to recoup loans through farmer sales to the
marketing boards.In addition to these direct subsidies,an
expanded network of cooperative marketing depots reduced
the transport costs that farmers incurred in selling maize in
remote areas.Pan-territorial pricing brought smallholders in
remote areas into production for the state and shifted produc-
tion patterns toward maize self-sufficiency at the expense of
other crops.At the same time most governments subsidized the
retail price of industrial maize meal to consumers,thereby
raising the demand for domestic production under a policy of
maize self-sufficiency.These systems were not effective,however,
in recouping credit.By 1990,for instance,80 percent of
Zimbabwe’s smallholder farmers receiving maize inputs on loan
were in arrears.Inability to recoup loan losses contributed to
the financial drain on the state marketing systems that later
exposed them to pressure for reform.
WHY DID THE PRODUCTION SURGES STALL? 
• Unsustainable financial subsidies withdrawn. State
subsidies on inputs, producer prices, and consumer prices,
combined with limited recovery of input loans, exacerbated
fiscal crises in Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Because
governments could not afford to sustain these operations
indefinitely, they were forced to scale down their public
support and subsidy levels during the 1990s.As input costs
rose and state buying stations were withdrawn, farmer incen-
tives collapsed and production fell, particularly in the more
remote areas.
• National research systems atrophy. Public funding for
maize research fell in the 1980s and 1990s.The scientific and
institutional cooperation that created the maize success story of
earlier decades collapsed as governments prioritized other
expenditures.The number of new variety releases stalled,as
funding dried up and key personnel vacated the research
systems.
• Drought,poverty,and erratic crisis management
policies. Spotty rainfall in the 1990s contributed to erratic,
crisis-motivated food and agricultural management policies,
including greater reliance on food aid and a patchwork of often
poorly coordinated operations by nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) and donors.
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IMPACT
• Production.Today, farmers in East and Southern Africa plant
58 percent of maize area in improved varieties.A large part of
the 40 percent yield gain currently experienced over local
varieties can be attributed to improved hybrid cultivars,
although extension messages, improved management practices,
and the input and marketing subsidies fueling intensification of
fertilizer use are also responsible for the yield gains.
• Equity. During the post-independence period of rapid
smallholder production growth,nearly all small farmers in
Zimbabwe used improved varieties,while 87 percent did so in
Kenya,65 percent in Zambia,and 43 percent in Malawi.
• Sustainability.The highly subsidized input supply and
marketing systems proved financially unsustainable,accounting
for as much as 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in
Kenya and Zambia.Following withdrawal of these subsidies,the
artificially inflated production booms of the prior period led to
output contractions of 10–20 percent in the cases of Kenya,
Zambia,and Zimbabwe (see table).Ecologically,poor soil fertility
management under continuous fertilized maize production has
led to soil acidification,fertility loss,and plow and hoe pan
buildup in some locations.
KEY LESSONS FOR BUILDING FUTURE SUCCESSES
• Sustained investments in agricultural research. Seed
genetic change is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
improving the welfare of African smallholders. Maize successes
in the future will continue to depend not only on strategic
breeding improvements to relieve specific environmental and
disease problems and enhance the stability of net returns to
farmers, but also on enabling these advances to release land
for alternative uses and diversify the income sources for
farmers, regions, and nations. Continued development of
improved seeds and seed markets and a realistic understanding
of farmers’ needs remain critical. Patience and the commitment
to steady funding are crucial. Lead times for plant breeding
average roughly a decade, while new livestock technologies
may demand 15 to 20 years. Long-term commitment to agri-
cultural research remains essential.
• Financially viable input and credit delivery systems for
smallholders. In the past decade necessary investments in
germplasm research have declined and investments in institu-
tions that can translate germplasm advances into improved
income,including seed and grain markets,have faltered.The
public investments in state-controlled,coordinated input and
output markets were not fiscally sustainable.In many instances,
the cost of generating additional maize in remote areas
exceeded the value of the output.The policy focus on maize also
directed public resources to maize production in areas where
farmers may have been better off with a different set of crop
production and marketing investments.The current environ-
ment,however,is characterized by great policy instability.On the
one hand there is ostensible commitment to a more market-
oriented input and commodity pricing and distribution system.In
Kenya,Malawi,Zambia,and Zimbabwe,however,the state retains
a major presence in maize marketing and stockholding.
Government programs distributing subsidized inputs in Malawi,
Zambia,and Zimbabwe continue to cause uncertainty in input
markets and limit the incentives for private actors to invest
more aggressively.As a result,rural input and credit markets
remain highly fragmented.In the future,governments and their
partners must ensure policy stability and find financially sustain-
able models for delivering inputs and credit to smallholders.
• Political pressure and responsiveness. Can a local
constituency be formed to successfully stake a claim on public
resources over the long run to support agricultural research,
marketing institutions,and other kinds of growth-promoting
public goods? The experiences with maize in the four case study
countries underscore the strong connection between agricul-
tural development and governance.The early success of the
maize industry in Kenya and Zimbabwe can be attributed largely
to the strength of the institutions built by settler farmers,which
provided a constituency to encourage sustained public and
private support for the sector.Today farm lobbies are uniformly
weaker and smallholder farmers continue to be poorly repre-
sented in the political process.A crucial issue is how the key
growth- and equity-promoting investments in agricultural
research,infrastructure,and market institutions can be financed.
Perhaps most important,from where will the domestic political
pressure for these public investments come?   
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Maize production growth 
(compound annual growth rates)
BOOM PERIOD PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY
COUNTRY Years Growth (%) Years Growth (%)
Kenya 1965–80 3.3 1990–2000 -1.5
Malawi 1983–93 3.1 1994–2000 4.4
Zambia 1970–89 1.9 1990–2000 -2.4
Zimbabwe 1980–89 1.8 1990–2000 -0.2
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